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COMMENT
SUBVERTING THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE IN
THE "GAME" OF SPORTS STADIUM FINANCING
I. BACKGROUND: THE BATTLEGROUND OF STADIUM FINANCING
In 1984, the late Edward Bennet Williams, owner of Major league Base-
ball's Baltimore Orioles, announced he would not renew the team's lease at
Memorial Stadium in Baltimore.' This announcement set off a flurry of
activity among public officials and business leaders in and around Baltimore
- a city that remembers too well the damage to the local economy and
civic pride caused by the loss of Baltimore's only other professional sports
team, the National Football League (NFL) Colts.' As the story went:
In a dramatic midnight exodus, (owner) Robert Irsay moved
"his" Baltimore Colts out of Baltimore and into Indianapolis. The
team's departure dealt a devastating financial blow to Baltimore's
economy which, in 1984 alone, lost thirty million dollars in reve-
nues, wages and business. The deepest loss, however, was felt by the
people of Baltimore for whom the Colt's were a way of life for over
30 years (footnotes omitted).3
Accordingly, the leaders of Baltimore came up with a solution to prevent a
second exodus: build the Orioles a new baseball stadium.
During the summer of 1990, the Cleveland Indians invited Baseball
Commissioner Fay Vincent to a Wednesday evening game at Cleveland Sta-
dium, not to watch baseball, but to stump for approval of a county referen-
dum that would impose a fifteen year, two percent county tax on alcohol
and cigarettes.4 The proceeds of this so called "sin tax" would support tax-
exempt debt issued to build a new sports complex for the Indians and the
National Basketball Association's (NBA) Cleveland Cavaliers.5 The sports
complex and redevelopment district has a $280 million construction and
1. Petersen, Thinking About a Downtown Stadium for Baltimore, URB. LAND, Sept., 1988, at
21.
2. Id.
3. Note, Controlling Professional Sports Team Relocations: The Oakland Raiders' Antitrust
Case And Beyond, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 283 (1986).
4. Milwaukee J., May 4, 1990, at IC.
5. Bullard, Stadium Lawyers Hold Powwow With Jacobs, CRAINS CLEV. Bus., Mar. 12, 1990,
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land acquisition cost.6 Both teams have promised long term commitments
to the City should the referendum pass.7
By the end of the 1988 baseball season, the floundering Chicago White
Sox were facing slumping attendance levels and declining revenues. The
White Sox had not contended for a pennant since 1983, and were perhaps
the only remaining team in baseball that failed to break even by 1988.
Enter the City of St. Petersburg, Florida sporting the new $103 million (and
counting) Suncoast Dome,8 $20 million in low interest loans, a radio and
television package in excess of $10 million,9 and a warm invitation to move
the White Sox to Florida.
The City of Chicago and State of Illinois eventually responded with
$150 million for a new Comiskey Park and $60 million in additional conces-
sions over the next ten years.10 By recent estimates, additional land acquisi-
tion costs could push the cost of a new stadium upward another $30
million.' Both stadium projects, the Suncoast Dome in St. Petersburg and
the new Comiskey Park in Chicago, are being paid for or supported by state
or local tax revenues.
The process of financing a major sports complex has taken some dra-
matic turns in the past ten years. A number of high profile projects provide
a tour though the elements of stadium financing, the costs born by taxpay-
ers and municipalities, and the benefits provided to sports franchises and
the communities in which they reside.
II. SOME IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF STADIUM FINANCING
A. The Anatomy of a Deal
Most large scale real estate development projects share several common
elements. Because most lenders and investors seek to protect the same in-
terest - their capital - each project must fulfill certain formalities and
requirements.12 The initial formalities usually include a list of studies, soil
samples or surveys undertaken to assess the risk of the project and any
potential conflicts with the surrounding economy that could endanger the
6. Id.
7. Milwaukee J., supra note 4.
8. Christine, The Games Cities Play, FLA. BUS.-TAMPA BAY, Mar. 1990, at 28.
9. Milwaukee J., Oct. 25, 1988, at IA.
10. Id.
11. Chicago Tribune, Feb. 14, 1990, at 1.




project after construction begins. 3 The second stage may determine own-
ership and control of the facility as well as building design.14 The final
preconstruction stage entails compiling financial documentation, acquiring
leases from tenants, and contracting for facility management and
maintenance.' 5
The preacquisition study is typically comprised of a list of topics ad-
dressing the impact of the project on the surrounding area and community
at large:
This should include a check of the zoning and restrictions of the
land to be built on, expected growth in the area, access to transpor-
tation or main highway arteries, public parking, the suitability of the
locale to the prospective tenants, current and prospective competing
buildings in the areas, and overall personality of the vicinity. 6
Additionally, zoning data must be compiled to ensure the selected site can
be used for the intended purpose of the facility, and to assess the potential
costs of water, sewer and other utilities costs.' Changes to the Internal
Revenue Code in 1984 and 1986 made it nearly impossible for municipali-
ties to directly finance sports stadiums. Therefore, most preacquisition ex-
penses including utility charges and land studies are paid for by
municipalities as direct subsidies out of short term revenues rather than
proceeds from the issuance of long term debt.
Stage two entails allocating ownership and control of the facility and
building design. Issues addressed at this stage include the identification of
the land, the nature of the acquiring entity for the facility, building design
and determination of ultimate long-term control. The simple solution to
these issues would seem to necessitate having the team/developer, 18
[B]uy or own the land, but, there are other ways by which the land
can be attained at minimum or no cost to the team/developer. [It]
can option the property until the success of the project is assured,
13. See generally J. BAGBY, REAL ESTATE FiNANCING DESK BOOK, 84-92 (1980)(an exami-
nation of the step-by-step process of financing commercial real estate projects, specifically urban
office buildings), CRUMP, supra note 12, at 1-45, 85-104 (1984)(a step-by-step guide through a




16. Id. at 86.
17. Id.
18. As discussed in the following paragraphs, a team or sports franchise may also be the
developer who builds the stadium on a parcel of land purchased by some other entity, such as a
state, municipality or corporation.
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[enter] into partnership with the owner of the land, or put together a
joint venture or syndicate... to buy or option the land.19
One option that appears desirable in light of the Internal Revenue Code
changes is the ground lease. A ground lease essentially involves a munici-
pality acquiring and preparing a site for development, then leasing the land,
for a nominal amount, to the sports franchise who privately finances con-
struction of the stadium.20 The municipality may be able to issue municipal
debt to pay the acquisition costs and then collect fees for managing the
stadium, or revenues from stadium parking on the land surrounding the
facility.21 The franchise receives a development ready stadium site for a
fraction of a yearly mortgage and may also receive a subordination' or
guarantee from the municipality of the franchise's debt. Prior to 1984,
Dade County in southern Florida, employing a variation of this financing
scheme, acquired a parcel of land from a group of local developers. The
160-acre parcel was prepared for development and leased to the NFL's
Miami Dolphins for $1 per year.23 On this land, the Dolphins constructed
the $90 million Joe Robbie Stadium which opened in 1987.24
Immediately prior to construction, a survey of the site specifications of
the facility and the architect's drawings are necessary.
The lender will want to see a complete set of plans and specifica-
tions before issuing a firm commitment letter.... A survey of the
property owned or optioned is an important part of the package for
lenders. When the long-term mortgage is funded, the take-out
lender will require an 'as built survey'. 25
The final stage of the project involves compiling financial information,
leasing facility space and contracting for management and maintenance.
Important financial information that a lender may include:
[Flinancial projections on the project when complete.
.. The lender wants to'know about the developer's character, repu-
tation and experience.... Many lenders will want to see a personal
financial statement from the borrower to ensure that they are finan-
cially capable to overcome contingencies, since most construction
19. J. BAGBY, supra note 13, at 86.
20. See N. STEUBEN, REAL ESTATE CASES AND ARTICLES 240-41, 610-27 (1989).
21. Id.
22. Under a typical ground lease, a landowner who leases a parcel to a developer has first
claim on the improvements on the land upon default of the tenant developer. A subordination
entails the landowner relinquishing the claim to the lender to allow the tenant to obtain construc-
tion and permanent financing. Id.
23. D. PETERSEN, CONVENTION CENTERS, STADIUMS AND ARENAS, 45 (1989).
24. Id.
25. J. BAGBY, supra note 13, at 86.
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lenders require that the borrower guarantee completion. In some
cases, lenders will require an even more thorough breakdown of a
company's finances.
... Financial statements and other pertinent financial data on the
major tenants. Having strong tenants can lower the cost of money
to the developer.26
The tenants of a sports stadium usually include a major sports franchise, (if
the team owns the stadium then the developer and anchor tenant may be
one in the same), a second professional team, minor league or amateur
franchise, restaurants, hotels, souvenir stores and food and beverage conces-
sion stands.
Each of these elements is influenced by outside forces and institutions
which add external costs and create additional risks for the project. The
financing aspect of a large scale real estate transaction is so interdependent
and interrelated to the local, national and international economies that it
must be viewed as a product of conditions external to the project, rather
than a force shaping events.27 One of the major influences on such a real
estate mega-project is the federal government, with its hundreds of national
and regional regulatory agencies, bureaus and tax authorities.2"
B. The Effects of the 1986 and 1984 Revisions
to the Internal Revenue Code
Prior to 1984, to aid sports franchises in financing multimillion dollar
stadium and coliseum projects, state and local governments would issue
municipal debt to raise the funds necessary for construction. Most sports
franchises were not financially able (or perhaps not willing), to issue debt of
this size at an affordable interest rate, given investors perception of the risks
associated with professional sports. However, this municipal debt was at-
tractive to investors because it was tax-exempt. That is, an individual did
not have to pay taxes on interest income from these bonds. This practice is
the essence of tax-exempt financing.29
The history of tax exempt financing begins with the Tariff Act of 1913
that exempts from investors' net income the "interest upon the obligations
of a state or any political subdivision thereof."'30 This history became well
26. Id. at 86-87.
27. Id. at 3.
28. See THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL (1989-90) OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL
REGISTER, WASHINGTON, D.C.
29. See Comment, Multi-Family Housing Bonds: Can The Tax Code Provide An Efficient And
Effective Low Income Housing Program?, 5 VA. TAX REV. 497, 499-52 (Winter 1986).
30. Pub. L. No. 63-16, ch. 16, § Ib, 38 Stat. 114 at 168.
19911
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documented as tax-exempt municipal financing became a popular tool to
finance urban housing projects:
The federal government through the income tax laws has provided
an exemption for interest on bonds issued "by or on behalf of" state
and localities since 1913 when the first income tax was enacted.
Although states and localities first took advantage of this exception
by issuing general obligation bonds, they later issued revenue bonds
to help finance private business activities. The Internal Revenue
Service explicitly legitimized this practice in 1954 (footnotes
omitted).31
Generally referred to as Industrial Development Bonds, (IDBs) 32, the
two most widely issued municipal financing tools are general obligation
bonds and revenue bonds.33 The distinction between these two types of fi-
nancing mechanisms is simple: general obligation bonds are issued by a
municipality's political subdivision and are "guaranteed for repayment by a
pledge of the issuing government's tax revenues and the general credit.
[Therefore], tax revenues are available for repayment of such bonds if pro-
ject revenues prove to be inadequate."' 34 On the other hand, revenue bonds
are, "repaid solely from the revenues generated by the facilities constructed
with the bond proceeds. In the issuance of this type of bond, the political
subdivision acts solely as a conduit for the issuance of the bonds. It has no
obligation to use its tax revenues to finance any shortfall."3 Proceeds from
IDBs have been used as subsidies to overcome obstacles to economic recov-
ery,36 redevelop blighted urban areas" and to promote projects with out-
standing public merit38 such as airports.39
Nonetheless, IDBs have become an appealing target for tax reformers in
Congress despite the large number of successful projects undertaken for the
31. Comment, supra note 29, at 497, 498-99.
32. IDBs issued by states, municipalities or their political subdivisions are tax exempt to
investors if the bond falls into certain categories. These include, prior to 1984,... I.R.C. § 103(b)
(West Supp. 1986).
33. Thomas, Special Report: An Analysis of the New Industrial Development Bond Rules, TAX
NoTEs 691-698 (1984).
34. Comment, supra note 29, at 499.
35. Id.
36. Thomas, supra note 33, at 691.
37. See generally General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, H.R. Doc. No. 3838,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1986).
38. Thomas, supra note 33, at 691.
39. H.R. Doc. No. 3838, supra note 37.
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public benefit' because of the significant role federally subsidized financing
plays in the financial markets and the economy:
The sharp growth in their (IDBs) volume in recent years may be
seen as a metaphor for the equally sharp growth in federal budget
deficits. Curtailing the volume of exempt bonds helps close the
budget gap without appearing to raise anyone's taxes, since the rate
that applies to the bonds that survive remains the same: zero. Other
considerations lend support to those favoring restrictions on IDBs.
As the volume of IDBs increases, the attractiveness of other exempt
bonds diminishes, making the task of financing state and local gov-
ernment more expensive. (footnotes omitted).41
The 1984 revisions to the Internal Revenue Code, known as the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984 (the "1984 Act"),42 were designed to curtail IDB
issuances. However, the short term effect was to accelerate IDB activity as
issuers rushed to take advantage of transitional rules.43
When the 1984 Act took effect,44 two provisions effected municipal fi-
nancing of sports facilities. The chief provision of the 1984 Act was a state-
by-state limitation on the overall volume of IDBs issued within a calendar
year.45 The second provision was a prohibition on the use of IDB proceeds
40. Despite the characterization by some opponents of the use of tax-exempt financing as an
expenditure that is outside the public purposes of private activity bonds, later sections of this
analysis will point out the ongoing attempts by some local leaders to obtain tax-exempt financing
for the sole purpose of building stadiums to entice a franchise to relocate or to keep an existing
franchise in place. Therefore, it would seem this debate is not over the definition of a significant
public purpose, but over the allocation of limited tax resources to local projects. Definitions in the
Internal Revenue Code can be misleading in this respect. See GREATER MILWAUKEE COMMIT-
TEE, BREWER TASK FORCE REPORT III (Dec. 10, 1990).
41. Thomas, supra note 33, at 691.
42. Id. Additionally, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TETRA) was
the initial attack on IDBs. It stated:
No more than 25% of the proceeds of a small issue IDB may be used to finance an auto
dealership, a recreation or entertainment facility, or a facility for retailing food and bever-
ages. No part of the proceeds of small issue IDBs may be used to finance a golf course,
country club, massage parlor, tennis club, skating facility, racquet sports facility, hot tub
facility, suntan facility, or race track. I.R.C. section 103 (b)(6)(O).
Id. at 691 n.10.
43. Id. at 692.
44. The 1984 Act essentially effected post 1985 issuances and those in late 1984:
Effective Date: The volume limit applies to 1984 and all subsequent calendar years. How-
ever, bonds issued in 1984 are not included if they were introduced before June 19, 1984.
Since IDBs are induced on or before the date of issue, often several months before, it is
reasonable to assume that less than half of the volume of bonds to be issued in 1984 by
most issuers will be subject to the limit.
Thomas, supra note 33, at 694.
45. Id. at 692.
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to acquire land, existing property or certain enumerated types of facilities. 6
However, even though significantly restricted, tax-exempt stadium financ-
ing was still possible.
The state-by-state volume limitation effects bonds known as private ac-
tivity bonds. These are bonds issued for a private purpose that the federal'
government appeared to have no particular interest in subsidizing.47 Under
the Internal Revenue Code,48 however, sports facilities retained their ex-
emption after the 1984 Act was passed and thus were not classified as pri-
vate activity bonds.49
The 1984 Act also greatly limited the use of municipal debt proceeds to
acquire land, existing property (unless the property was to be substantially
rehabilitated), and certain enumerated types of facilities. 0 With respect to
land acquisition, "[i]n general, no more than 25% of the proceeds of an
IDB may be used directly or indirectly to acquire land."51 When property
has an existing use, "[n]one of the proceeds of an IDB may be used to
acquire [an] interest in [the] property...." 52 The exception to this restric-
tion allows acquisition when "the first use of such property is pursuant to
such acquisition" or for the purpose of rehabilitation under generous guide-
lines enumerated in the Internal Revenue Code. Finally, the 1984 Act ex-
tends a 1982 prohibition on the financing of certain facilities 3 to prohibit
any portion of IDB proceeds to provide "any airplane, skybox, or other
private luxury box, any health club facility, any facility primarily used for
gambling, or any store the principal business of which is the sale of alco-
holic beverages for consumption off premises." The conclusion, after pas-
sage of the 1984 Act, was that a stadium containing luxury boxes may
receive tax-exempt financing if no part of the IDB proceeds were used to
provide the skyboxes.14
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (the "1986 Act"), "raised significant new
barriers to the use of tax-exempt debt for public and private purposes, and
will change the face of public finance.. . ."'I The landmark provision of
the 1986 Act that concerned stadium developers was the removal of sports
46. Id. at 695-96.
47. Id. at 691.
48. I.R.C. § 103 (b)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1986).
49. See Thomas, supra note 33, at 691 n.4, and I.R.C. § 103 (b) (West Supp. 1986).
50. Thomas, supra note 33, at 695-96.
51. Id. at 696.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 696 n.10.
54. Thomas, supra note 33, at 696.




facilities from an exemption list, which allowed proceeds from IDBs to be
used for sports facility development and remain tax-exempt to investors.
The 1986 Act's rules spelled the end of many tax-exempt bond proceed
uses; for example, sports facilities, convention halls and parking facilities
are specifically exempted from being considered private activities eligible for
tax-exempt financing. '56
Moreover, the 1986 Act recognized a public use requirement on facili-
ties to be financed by tax-exempt IDBs. Treasury department regulation.
required a facility to serve the general public or be available on a regular
basis for general public use to qualify for financing with tax-exempt IDBs57
C. Alternative Financing Options
Among a long list of financing alternatives, a few particular and contro-
versial methods have been widely used. One of these alternatives is the sale
or lease of a facility's name. Some better known examples include well rec-
ognized professional and major college sports complexes.
In Syracuse, New York, the Carrier Dome, which seats more than
32,000 spectators, is home to the "Orangemen" of Syracuse University
where the Syracuse football and basketball teams play their games. The
Carrier Corporation, best known as manufacturers of residential heating
and air conditioning units, secured the name of the dome with a $2.75 mil-
lion donation to Syracuse University.58
Rich Stadium in Buffalo, New York is home to the Buffalo Bills of the
NFL. The stadium was so named after a $1.5 million gift from the Rich
Corporation and its president Bob Rich of Buffalo.5 9 The Rich corporation,
also Rich Products, Inc., is the largest family owned frozen food manufac-
turer in the country.'
Sullivan Stadium in Foxboro, Massachuttes, is the home to the NFL's
New England Patriots. When originally constructed, the stadium was
named Schaefer Stadium in exchange for a $1 million dollar gift from the
Schaefer Beer Company.61 A similar transaction occurred recently in Min-
neapolis where Target Department Stores aided financing of the $70 mil-
56. Id.
57. See, Thomas, supra note 33.
58. D. PETERSEN, supra note 23, at 48.
59. Id.
60. Christine, The Games Cities Play, FLA. Bus. - TAMPA BAY, Mar. 1990, at 28.
61. D. PETERSEN, supra note 23, at 48.
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lion62 Timberwolves' basketball arena.63 The new arena has been named
the Target Center.64
Other well known examples include the Los Angeles Forum, home of
the NBA's Los Angeles Lakers, that was renamed the Great Western Fo-
rum. Great Western Financial Corp., a Beverly Hills thrift, will pay $15
million to $30 million for the privilege.6 1 In Sacramento, California, Atlan-
tic Richfield Co., the oil firm known as Arco, already has its name on the
new Arco arena, home to the NBA's Sacramento Kings.6 6 Arco will pay
$25 million to $30 million to have its name on Arco Arena and the soon to
be built baseball stadium, Arco Park.67
Additionally, direct municipal or state subsidies, in one form or an-
other, are something that has been considered by some states as alternative
to tax-exempt financing.68 These subsidies can take the form of a tax "holi-
day" where the local government will waive its right to property taxes for a
certain period.69 In Milwaukee, for example, a new stadium for Major
League Baseball's Milwaukee Brewers is expected to cost $121 million.70 A
plan supported by Milwaukee's County Executive would exempt the Brew-
ers from paying property taxes if they decide to build and own the stadium
themselves.7" This exemption could save the club about $4.5 million per
year.
72
A third alternative is to finance construction and the long-term opera-
tion of the stadium through the sale of luxury suites and club seat leases.
Luxury suites resemble hotel rooms within a sports stadium, providing
leaseholders with such amenities as parking passes, private elevators, a
bathroom, wet bar, television, refrigerator, ice machine, food and beverage
service, and additional outdoor seating. Some possess sliding glass enclo-
sures to enable those in the suite to "experience the crowd".7 3 Generally,
leases for suites are for seven or ten years and can cost from around
62. Urbonya, Japanese Bank Plans Unit Here, MINNEAPOLIS - ST. PAUL Bus., Feb. 12,
1990, at 1.
63. The Timberwolves are Minnesota's National Basketball Association (NBA) expansion
team that began play in 1989.
64. Brauer, Defying Dearth of Endorsements Pooh Starts Own Product, MINNEAPOLIS - ST.
PAUL Bus., Feb. 12, 1990, at 1.
65. Milwaukee J., May 17, 1989, § C (Business), at 1.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Uhlfelder, supra note 55.
69. Id.
70. Milwaukee J., May 17, 1989, § D (Metro), at 1.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. S. Byers, Skyboxes: A Hot Ticket, THE Bus. J. - CHARLOTTE, May 28, 1990, at 1.
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$50,000.00 to in excess of $200,000.00 per year, depending on the suite's
size and location within the stadium or arena.74 Club seats, another VIP
section, are usually leased for the same seven or ten year lease for considera-
bly less money.75
This financing alternative has a number of advantages. For example, if
construction of a facility called for 100 luxury suites at an average cost of
$100,000.00 per year and 10,000 club seats at $1,000.00 per year, with each
feature requiring one year advance deposit, at 80% occupancy, the $16 mil-
lion could be used to serve a number of important functions. The revenues
could guarantee the short term construction financing, actually finance con-
struction, or cover yearly operating costs of the facility.
However, this form of financing could lose some of its attractiveness as a
result of congressional changes to the Internal Revenue Code that disal-
lowed the tax deduction previously available to those who use luxury suites
for business purposes.76 Additionally, as NFL owners continue to study
ways to divide luxury suite and club seat revenues among all of the
franchises, the income stream from current lease payments is less certain in
the future.77
A final alternative is the obvious but often over-looked issuance of taxa-
ble bonds. If the difference between interest rates on taxable and tax ex-
empt debt is within five percent, taxable debt will be, at least, a viable
source of funds.78 Taxable bonds also offer the advantage of not being sub-
ject to the restrictions on advanced refunding and the accounting require-
ments associated with tax-exempt bonds.79 Taxable bonds may become a
particularly viable alternative too, if interest rates stay relatively low. 0
One place where taxable bonds can be sold is in the international mar-
ketplace."' Foreign investors have already shown they are willing to invest
in state and municipal governments.82 "Japanese banks, like the Dai - Ichi
Kangyo Bank, Ltd., know the credit ratings of several thousand United
States municipal governments and the Japanese have liberalized their policy
toward investment in Unites States bonds. Some projects may even sell
bonds denominated in foreign currencies." 3
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. D. PETERSEN, supra note 23, at 46.
77. Id.





83. UhIfelder, supra note 55.
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III. THE COST AND BENEFTS
A. The Benefits to a Municipality
Economically, a government's interests and objectives in a stadium pro-
ject are typically the revitalization of an economically depressed area and
an increase in the tax base as stadium construction brings new hotels, res-
taurants, and retail stores to the area. Significant municipal expenditures'
should, therefore, the theory goes, be repaid by the activity they create:
You own a pair of skies and you buy a lift ticket at Vail; you own a
baseball team and you buy the best pitcher in the market; You in-
herit a boat and you build a boat dock; you inherit a football team
and you build a stadium. Your son wants to play basketball and you
spring for the best shoes available; you own the company that
makes the shoe and you spring for Michael Jordan to endorse it.84
The infusion of money into major college and professional athletics has
been significant: "athletics has become the 25th largest industry in the
country, generating some $47 billion annually."' ' Sports franchises and ur-
ban leaders now realize what veteran tourist and convention center promot-
ers have always known about attracting large numbers of people to urban
events: "just think about what happens every time we get a convention of
10,000 or 15,000 people in here for three or four days. It's like a snowstorm
of dollar bills." 86
In New Orleans, the NFL's Saints, who play their home games at the
Superdome, recently staged a turnaround from their perennial showing in
the bottom of the division. By Christmas 1987, the team won nine games
and would eventually make the playoffs. This pushed up revenues for local
hotels, restaurants, bars, parking lots, gas stations, taxis and more.87 Be-
cause more wins means more fans, which generates more revenue:
[Mianagers are busy thinking up ways to pull the fan in off the
streets and away from competitors. There are dollar all-you-can-eat
Saints parties; parties with free beer on tap whenever the Saints are
in the lead; and, of course, Saints raffles and pools. The proprietors
of local watering holes and restaurants report increased revenues of
anywhere from 5% to 50% on "Saints Sunday" with the average
increase in business being about 15%.88
84. Nickell, Sports Talk, NEW ORLEANS CITY Bus., § 1, Aug. 29, 1988, at 1.
85. Id.
86. Ridenhour, Bringing in the Business, NEW ORLEANS CrrY Bus., § 1, Nov. 23, 1987, at 1.
87. Veronis, Dollars March in Along with the Winning Saints, NEw ORLEANS CITY Bus., § 1,




To most political leaders, sports facilities and professional sports teams
mean money, yet they also mean acquiring and retaining a "Major League"
Image.
The 'economic value a baseball team brings to a city can't be over-
looked' points out Erving Kaufmann, owner of the Kansas City
Royals. 'We are in the smallest market in baseball, yet we bring
$160 million to Kansas City every year. In addition, for six months
of the year your name is in every newspaper and on every T.V. sta-
tion in the country. When you take that into consideration, it's
worth it to build a $100 million stadium.' 89
The impact a team can have on the economy and the image of a city is
significant. There is, however, a third benefit - an intangible - articulated
by some Milwaukee Brewer's supporters to the leaders of county
government:
The Milwaukee Brewers are a very important economic asset to Mil-
waukee County, Southeastern Wisconsin, and the entire state. Re-
cent studies have indicated that the Brewers generate approximately
$200 million annually in direct or indirect economic activity. Per-
haps the greater and more important benefit of having the Brewers
in Milwaukee County, however, is that their presence here stamps
Milwaukee as a "Major League" city, affecting not only the way
people around the country (and in a surprisingly large part of the
world) view Milwaukee, but also the way Milwaukeeans view
ourselves."9"
Therefore, many vocal advocates of using municipal and state subsidies to
retain professional sports teams point to the economic and social benefits a
team brings to a city. Advocates also point out some difficult to describe
psychological benefit received by being able to identify yourself with a pro-
fessional sports team. Success in professional and major college sports can
be a unique positive rallying point for an entire city. These are some of the
reasons municipalities and states fight so hard to keep their "major league"
team in their city.
89. Christine, supra note 8, at 28.
90. Letter from Gerald Schwerm, Director, Department of Public Works and Development,
and Brigid Sullivan, Director, Department of Parks, Recreation and Culture to David F. Schulz,
Milwaukee County Executive and F. Thomas Ament, Chairman of the Milwaukee County Board
(April 8, 1989).
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B. The Cost to Taxpayers of What Teams Receive:
Some Recent Examples
Professional sports, while being essentially labor intensive, can be very
financially profitable.9 ' Therefore, it is not difficult to see why owners are
reluctant to grant new franchises especially because much of the revenue is
shared among the existing franchises. When expansion does take place, it
can be expensive:
So you want to buy a team when Major League Baseball ex-
pands? First thing you'll need is a local ownership group with sub-
stantial wealth. Baseball's idea of substantial wealth starts around
$100,000,000.00. That's a lot of zeros.
If you're still in the game, you need a commitment from state
and local government. That's so you can get a favorable lease, tax
breaks, and low corporate financing.
A stadium - preferably 40,000 seats, open air, grass surface,
state of the art drainage system - is also part of the package.
Then be ready to spend a couple of seasons building a minor
league system and don't expect the other owners to cut you in on the
current TV contract.
If you have all those things, get at the back of the line.92
With expansion perhaps an unrealistic dream for some cities, the next alter-
native, requiring considerably less time and money, may be to lure a team
away from another city.
The most well publicized move of this type began in 1978 when the
Oakland Raiders and owner Al Davis announced they were considering a
move to Los Angeles to make the 80,000 plus seat Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum (L.A. Coliseum) their new home as the Los Angeles Raiders.
Faced with opposition from the football league and its commissioner, the
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission filed an antitrust law suit
against the NFL and its twenty-eight teams.93 The suit alleged the commis-
sioner and the owners had conspired to block the Raiders move from Oak-
land in violation of Federal antitrust laws.94 When the Raiders actually
91. Plume, Five Year Plan Doesn't Call For Profit Until 1990, NEw ORLEANs CrrY Bus., § 2,
Aug. 15, 1988, at 5B. (Jim Finks, general manager of the NFL's New Orleans Saints, claims that
owning a football team isn't profitable, but then states, "you have to consider John Mecom, Jr.
started with an $8 million team (in 1966) and sold it (in 1985) for $70 million).
92. Christine, supra note 8.
93. L.A. Times, March 5, 1989, § D (Metro), at 1.
94. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381
(9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. National Football League v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., 105 S.Ct. 397
(1984). In 1978, Rule 4.3 of Article IV of the NFL Constitution required unanimous approval of
all the 28 teams of the League whenever a team seeks to relocate. Id.
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moved to Los Angeles in 1982, they joined the suit as plaintiffs against the
NFL and the League's other twenty-seven teams.95
The Coliseum Commission and the Raiders eventually prevailed and
were awarded $16.41 million in damages in 1983.96 After numerous ap-
peals and years in court, the suit would settle in 1989 for approximately $20
million.9' Nonetheless, this suit established an important precedent in
American professional sports, widening the rights of individual franchises
to move from one place to another over league objections.98
Given these widened rights, municipalities have attempted to gain long
term commitments from franchises before spending millions to keep the
team.99 As previously pointed out, these commitments often come in ex-
change for considerable state or municipal spending on sports facilities.
The following sections describe some recent examples.
1. St. Petersburg, Florida
In a bold move to induce a Major League Baseball team to relocate and
to attract league attention for expansion, the City of St. Petersburg and
Pinellas County, Florida constructed a $103 million (and counting) domed
sports stadium complete with fifty-eight luxury boxes." ° The incentive
package also included such possible perks as $20 million in low interest
loans, obtained through a tax-exempt bond issuance under a grandfather
provision of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and a radio and television pack-
age of over $10 million. 1' Obviously, this project is ambitious. In fact,
never before has such a facility been built without at least one major sports
franchise as a likely tenant. 2 Consequently, the project had more than a
few detractors:
Dome-building plans of the mid-1980s were certainly perceived
as presumptuous by former commissioner Ueberroth, who fired off a
heat seeking missile of sorts to former St. Petersburg Mayor Ed
Cole. The "no-holds-barred" note advised the city against stadium
construction and emphasized that such a facility would produce no
franchise guarantee from Major League Baseball.
95. L.A. Times, supra note 93.
96. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d, at 1386.
97. L.A. Times, supra note 93.
98. Id.
99. The best example of this type of commitment is the one asked for by the City of Cleveland
from the Cleveland Indians and Cleveland Cavaliers in a deal to build a new sports complex in the
city of Cleveland sponsored, in part, by municipal tax dollars. Supra note 4.
100. Milwaukee J., Oct. 25 1988, at IA.
101. Id.
102. Christine, supra note 8, at 28.
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The Dome did, however, produce controversy and more than a
spate of animosity - especially from up-county tourist interests, who
didn't want a chunk of bed-tax revenues pledged to Dome financing.
It was attacked as fiscally irresponsible by Pinellas County commis-
sioners, who went to the courts in an attempt to halt construction,
and by three St. Petersburg City Council members who voted
against it.10 3
Over the objections, construction proceeded and the stadium, today, is "just
a good sprucing-up away from being baseball ready."'" Though it is not
likely a team would actually be on the field before the 1993 season, landing
a franchise when the Major Leagues announce their expansion plans is what
it will take to make the Suncoast Dome worth it.'0 5
2. Indianapolis, Indiana
The Indianapolis Hoosier Dome opened in may 1984. Construction be-
gan on the stadium and convention exposition center in the spring of
1982.106 Development costs totalled about $82 million by the time the facil-
ity opened." 7 The Dome was financed through local tax initiatives, aided
by $30 million in foundation grants and endorsements.' 08 Building a com-
plex of this size without a tenant was a high risk venture, however, Indian-
apolis had expectation that the NFL's Baltimore Colts might be attracted to
the city. The Colts did, in fact, relocated from Baltimore by the time the
facility opened. 1°9 The Hoosier Dome also serves as an extension of the
adjacent convention center to accommodate large conventions and trade
shows.1 0 The convention center includes as many as sixty meeting rooms
and houses two large ballrooms."' The stadium and convention center
share management, staff, and parking facilities." 2 This factor, together
with grant financing, keeps the Hoosier Dome's debt service and operating
costs substantially below those of similar facilities."'
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. Incidentally, a number of recent articles place St. Petersburg at the top of the
Leagues list as the next in line to receive a baseball franchise, along with Buffalo, New York and
Denver, Colorado, id.; and Shepard, Bringing Triple-A Baseball to Memphis Would Take $25
Million, Lots of Luck, MEMPHS Bus. J., § 1, July 9,1990, at 3.
106. D. PETERSEN, supra note 23, at 46.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 83.
109. Petersen, supra note 1.
110. D. PETERSEN, supra note 23, at 84.
111. Id.




The Hoosier Dome has also achieved one of its major objectives - to
stimulate downtown development:
The convention center project has been a major catalyst for develop-
ment and redevelopment in the downtown area, complementing
other area projects. Since the announcement of the second phase -
the convention center/expanded Hoosier Dome project, the follow-
ing developments have appeared in its vicinity: a 578-room Westin
Hotel, a 1,000-car parking garage with a $6 million public park on
its top floor, the Pan Am Plaza and Sports Building, and Union
Station. 114
Indianapolis has also seen a number of businesses from outside the city
moving to - or moving back to - downtown:
'We wanted to be downtown,' said Newett (a small business
owner), noting that his shop is opening in an increasingly popular
entertainment area. 'Not particularly because of the bars, but for
instance, this weekend 60,000 people will be coming out of the Hoo-
sier Dome after a Colts game.
'We enjoyed a good business on the north side, but I think we'll
do more business downtown.'" 5
As mentioned in a previous section, the success of the Indianapolis Hoosier
Dome has created new development, not only in Indianapolis, but in a few
other cities that are considering sports stadium projects.1 1 6
3. Milwaukee, Wisconsin
In an attempt to dispel rumors that the Milwaukee Brewers were des-
tined to leave Milwaukee due to an inability to financially compete with
teams in larger markets, a Milwaukee County Board committee recom-
mended the Brewers build a new $121 million stadium, with the county
paying the land acquisition and preparation costs. 1 17 Luxury box revenues
would provide another source of income for a team in one of baseball's
smallest radio and television markets. Estimates for the county's contribu-
tion to the new stadium range from $47 million 8 to $100 million.119 The
114. D. PETERSEN, supra note 23, at 84.
115. Walsh, Country- Western Bar and Hot Tub Spa Latest Downtown Night Spots, INDIANAP-
OLIS Bus. J., § 1, Sept. 12, 1988, at 12A.
116. Often, the mere discussion of stadium development will send developers and investors
into action seeking to acquire land in the vicinity of the proposed new stadium. The success of
businesses surrounding sports stadiums in other cities can make certain land parcels very desirable
in a city that does not have a major facility.
117. Milwaukee Sentinel, May 16, 1990, at 1.
118. Id.
119. Milwaukee Sentinel, June 5, 1990, at 12.
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Brewers would also receive a local property tax exemption that would save
the team $4.5 million a year. 120
Financing for the stadium is being sought by the Brewers through tax-
exempt municipal bonds that would allow the team to use the City of Mil-
waukee as a conduit to sell the tax-exempt revenue bonds. 2 However,
because of recent amendments to the Internal Revenue Code that prohibit
direct tax-exempt municipal financing of sports stadiums, discussed previ-
ously, a team of legislators and city leaders have begun an uphill lobbying
effort aimed at persuading Congress to grant the Brewers a special tax-ex-
emption that would effectively allow the bond issuance under the 1986 tran-
sitional rules.122 Because tax-exempt bonds can be issued at roughly a 2%
lower interest rate than taxables, the $121 million Brewer project could save
approximately $2.5 million a year in interest.1 23
Not surprisingly, the $100 million cost to county government of the new
stadium has brought forward a number of critics. One group of urban lead-
ers makes a point that applies to most urban areas:
Those Milwaukeeans who can afford to attend baseball games
may see a new stadium at partial public expense as a fine thing.
Those who are struggling to make ends meet, those who are home-
less, those who are the working poor, regard it as an outrage.
... $100 million could build 2,000 homes capable of housing
8,000 to 10,000 people. And $100 million could remodel 10,000 in-
ner city homes capable of housing 40,000 to 50,000 people. 24
In addition, many business people who have not been the beneficiary of
tax-exempt financing have raised concerns about this ill effects of tax-ex-
empt financing and the current trend of tax dollar gifts to businesses, such
as sports teams, as incentives to relocate or not to relocate. These criticisms
stem from their own increased cost of capital: "[t]ax-exempt nongovern-
ment bonds have an anti-competitive and distortive effect on the economy.
Activities receiving tax-exempt financing have a significant advantage over
their competitors, which must raise capital with higher cost taxable
obligations."' 125
120. Milwaukee J., May 17, 1989, at 1C.
121. Milwaukee Sentinel, May 10, 1990, at 1.
122. Id at 12.
123. Id.
124. Milwaukee Sentinel, June 5, 1990, at 12.





The Miami Dolphins began their 1987 season in a new $90 million open
air stadium in suburban Miami, on the northern edge of Dade County.126
The 160 acre parcel of land on which the stadium was built was acquired by
Dade County from local developers and leased to the Dolphins for $1 per
year.1
2 7
The stadium was privately financed, due in part, to lease deposits total-
ing nearly $9 million on 208 luxury boxes and 10,200 club level seats.128
The yearly rate for a luxury box lease ranges from a low of $27,000.00 to a
high of $65,000.00 with a ten year lease.129 Club level seats also have a ten
year lease and rent from $600.00 to $1400.00 per year.130
In the initial planning stages, these lease deposits on preferred seating
were intended to play a larger role in financing:
A singular aspect of the development of the Joe Robbie Stadium
was the method of financing used to construct it. No public monies
were used; the facility was built with private funds alone. Robbie,
using the skybox and club seat deposits totaling $9 million as collat-
eral, attempted to entice a consortium of banks to back his project.
He was not entirely successful, however, until he listed the Dolphins
as collateral against the project. With the banks' backing, $83 mil-
lion was raised through a 30-year industrial revenue bond issue. In
effect, Robbie is banking on the team's drawing enough fans to make
the stadium sufficiently profitable to prevent the loss of his team.1 3'
As a result, Dolphin ticket prices at the time the stadium opened, were the
highest in the league at $26.00 per game. 132
5. Los Angeles, California
Following the 1988-89 season, the owner of the Los Angeles Raiders, Al
Davis, and the Los Angeles Coliseum Commission had a falling out over
plans to renovate the aging L. A. Coliseum.133 "The Raiders [had] an-
nounced plans to move to suburban Irwindale and build a stadium there,
and there [had] also been recent reports that if [the] deal [fell] through,
126. D. PETERSEN, supra note 23, at 45.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 120.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 46.
131. Id. at 120.
132. Id.
133. L.A. Times, supra note 93.
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Davis may even [have] consider[ed] moving back to Oakland. ' ' "M When
the 1990-91 season began a year and a half later, the Raiders still appeared
to be a team without a home.
The Los Angeles Raiders began in Oakland, California in 1959 as part
of the, now defunct, American Football League (AFL).13 Ironically, when
the Raiders' relationship with the Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum
soured over the Raiders demand for construction of luxury boxes, Al Davis,
former head coach and now owner, decided to move the team to Los Ange-
les. 136  Since the Los Angeles Rams had just recently moved from Los
Angeles to suburban Anaheim Stadium in Orange County, the L. A. Coli-
seum was eager to replace the Rams with another NFL franchise.137 The
Raiders move to Los Angeles took place in 1982.
This latest discussion of the Raiders moving out of Los Angeles, and
perhaps back to Oakland, was put to rest when the City of Los Angeles got
serious about making Davis an offer he couldn't refuse. By September, Da-
vis had what he wanted: a plan for renovation of the L.A. Coliseum com-
plete with luxury boxes and club seating. This plan completed the picture
for Davis (who got his long awaited luxury boxes), and for Los Angeles
who kept the Raiders, promising Davis more than the competition:
[T]he city (of Los Angeles) had certain natural advantages in the
bidding war with Oakland, Sacramento, and Irwindale. The ex-
pected sales value alone of planned luxury boxes in the Los Angeles
Coliseum could reach $12 million a year, and millions more could be
realized in a renovated stadium by selling elite club seating. The
prices that could be charged would be considerably higher than in
smaller cities with fewer corporate headquarters or wealthy
individuals.138
The final deal to renovate the coliseum became a reality when a group of
local politicians, including Mayor Tom Bradley, decided to relieve the Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission of its responsibilities in the nego-
tiations with Raiders owner Al Davis and "privatize" the facility:
This, they reasoned, would put the responsibility for coming up
with renovation plans and the money to finance them, as well as the
large cash payments Davis was demanding, on a private business
134. Id.
135. Note, Raiders: $Z2 Million, City of Oakland: 0 ... Was That the Final Gun?, 9 LOY.
L.A. ENTERTAINMENT L.J. 401 (1989).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. L.A. Times, Sept. 14, 1990, (Metro), at 3.
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team that had the wherewithal to bring together what the commis-
sion could not.
Oakland, Sacramento and Irwindale all came to rely substan-
tially on public money in making their bids. Los Angeles, using pri-
vate business as it did during the 1984 Olympic effort, would avoid
that necessity, and much of the political controversy that went with
it. 1 3 9
It appears for now, the Raiders and Al Davis have found a home in Los
Angeles.
IV. THE FUTURE OF STADIUM FINANCING
The future of sports stadium financing and the use of municipal tax-
revenues for construction is being forced down two different paths. One
path leads to a large market urban area where sports complexes are mainly
privately financed, the other path leads to a smaller market where munici-
pal or state subsidies are necessary to make a project viable and keep a
professional team in place. Therefore, larger cities are able to rely more on
the business community that benefits from the presence of the franchise,
while smaller cities with smaller economies rely, essentially, on the citizens
of the city by utilizing tax revenues.
The best examples of large market development occurred in Miami,
Florida and in Los Angeles, California. Joe Robbie Stadium in Miami was
financed without the use of public money."4  Individual investors
purchased $83 million in bonds backed by a group of banks. The Miami
Dolphin franchise and Joe Robbie (now, the Robbie family) bear nearly all
the risk and financial burden, should the stadium revenues fall short of
expenses.
The local business community in Los Angeles appears receptive to the
direction Mayor Tom Bradley and a few other local politicians have pointed
the negotiations between the Raiders and the Los Angeles Memorial Coli-
seum. The vast private wealth in Southern California is seen by may as
more than sufficient to renovate the Coliseum and satisfy the demands of Al
Davis.14 Other large markets will most likely follow in the path of Miami
and Los Angeles when the need arises to develop major sports complexes.
That is, cities may find it easier to coordinate local investors with develop-
ers than to finance the project themselves and, in turn, bear all or a portion
of the projects risk.
139. Id.
140. D. PETERSEN, supra note 23, at 120.
141. See, L.A. Times, supra note 138.
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In smaller markets like Charlotte, North Carolina and Milwaukee, Wis-
consin, the future of the franchise may rest upon a state or municipality's
decision to participate in a project's financing. An investor in Charlotte,
discussing a new football stadium for a prospective NFL franchise com-
mented on the feasibility of complete private financing for the stadium:
I would not want to go out and buy a franchise that might cost
$75 million and then build a stadium that might cost $75 million or
more and have $150 million in a project. Economically, you'd never
come out of it.
To me, the best way to make things happen is to have a joint
relationship with the state. It should be public and private. It's got
to make sense financially.142
The Milwaukee Brewers are currently negotiating the details of a similar
project that involves Milwaukee County participating significantly in devel-
opment of a new Brewer's stadium.
The stadium projects in both of these cities at this time are in the
preconstruction stages. However, both projects seem to be waiting for the
same signal before the next major step can be taken: public sector leader-
ship. While there is no need for a formal partnership between government
and the private sector, public sector leadership is a critical element needed
if the public sector is going to work with the better organized and more
experienced private sector. Once in place, the projects leaders can better
assess the needs of the project and the role the public and private sectors
must play. In this setting, the future of the urban mega-project really rests
upon incorporating a public/private partnership.143
JOHN D. FNmERTY, JR.
142. Byers, It's a Battle of Goliathsfor NFL Team, Bus. J. - CHARLOTTE, § I April 3, 1989,
at 1. Charlotte Hornets principal owner George Shinn, discussing a proposal by a rival group of
investors lead by Spartan Food Systems, Inc. founder Jerry Richardson. Id. The two groups are
competing to bring an NFL expansion team to the Carolinas. Id.
143. Freilich, Public-Private partnerships in Joint Development, MUN. FIN. J., 5, 14 (Winter
1986).
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